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NOTE
K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.: Limiting the
Protection of Section. 526 of the
Tariff Act of 1930
The rapid increase in gray market importation' has resulted in
considerable litigation and controversy over the appropriate inter-
pretation of section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930.2 Gray market
goods are goods manufactured abroad bearing a genuine foreign
trademark that is identical to the U.S. trademark.3 These goods are
sold legitimately overseas by the foreign manufacturer and ulti-
I Estimated sales of gray market goods over the past few years are $5.5 to $10 billion
annually. See Kersner & Stein, Judicial Construction of Section 526 and the Importation of Grey
Market Goods: From Total Exclusion to Unimpeded Entry, 11 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 251,
251 (1986). See also Feder, "Gray Market" Grew With Rise of Dollar, N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1986,
at D4, col. 2 (estimating gray market sales as $5 to $7 billion per year). The strength of the
U.S. dollar overseas increased the gray market industry in the early and mid-1980s. See
Comment, The Gray Market Controversy and the Court: Analysis of Conflicting Court of Appeals
Decisions on the Validity of Customs Regulations Permitting Unauthorized Third Party Importation of
Trademarked Goods, 18 SETON HALL L. REV. 55, 58 (1988).
2 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1982). This was originally enacted in the Tariff Act of 1922 and
then reenacted unchanged in the Tariff Act of 1930. Tariff Act of 1922, Pub. L. No. 67-
318, 42 Stat. 858 (1922); Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361, 46 Stat. 590 (1930).
Section 1526 provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section, it shall be unlawful
to import into the United States any merchandise of foreign manufacture if
such merchandise, or the label, sign, print, package, wrapper, or receptacle,
bears a trademark owned by a citizen of, or by a corporation or association
created or organized within, the United States, and registered in the Patent
and Trademark Office by a person domiciled in the United States, under the
provisions of sections 81 to 109 of title 15, and if a copy of the certificate of
registration of such trademark is filed with the Secretary of the Treasury, in
the manner provided insection 106 of said title 15, unless written consent of
the owner of such trademark is produced at the time of making entry.
(b) Any such merchandise imported into the United States in violation of
the provisions of this section shall be subject to seizure and forfeiture for
violation of the customs laws.
19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1982).
3 K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., - U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 1811, 1814-15 (1988). Well-
known products such as Dial soap, Seiko, Rolex and Citizen watches, Sony, Panasonic and
Maxell electronic goods, Colgate toothpaste, Duracell batteries, Kodak film, and Michelin
tires are a few of the goods susceptible to gray marketeers. Comment, supra note 1, at 57
n.6 (quoting Comments of The Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of Am. Trademarks, at
App. A, 1 (Oct. 20, 1986)); In re Importations Bearing Recorded U.S. Trademarks, Solici-
tation of Public Comment on Gray Market Policy Opinions, 51 Fed. Reg. 22,005 (1986)
(U.S. Customs Serv. Treas. Dep't).
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mately imported into the United States by third parties.4 This im-
portation occurs without the U.S. trademark owner's permission. 5
Neither the Customs Service 6 nor the courts have consistently imple-
mented or enforced a policy to protect U.S. trademark owners from
the strong intrabrand competition that results from parallel gray
market importation. 7
The Customs Service has incorporated section 526 into its regu-
lations by denying entry to imports that bear a recorded trademark
or tradename.8 The regulations provide exceptions that allow im-
4 K Mart Corp., 108 S. Ct. at 1814-15. A gray market arises when a price difference
between two markets allows an arbitrageur to take advantage of this difference by buying
in the market when prices are lower and selling in the market when prices are higher. W.
Goebel Porzellanfabrik v. Action Indus., Inc., 589 F. Supp. 763, 764 n.l (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
Importers of gray goods believe that the gray market develops as a result of different affili-
ates of a manufacturer being able to sell at different prices the same trademarked item at
any given point in time. See Comment, supra note 1, at 58 n.7.
5 K.Mart Corp., 108 S. Ct. at 1814-15. Trademark owners often refer to this type of
importation as "parallel importation." Id. Some courts and commentators, however, be-
lieve that parallel importation technically implies a more specific type of gray market im-
portation in which the U.S. trademark owner is the actual importer of the same goods.
Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1985). See Hansen, Gray
Market Goods: A Lighter Shade of Black, 13 BROOKLYNJ. INT'L L. 249, 249 n.3 (1987).
6 The Customs Service is the administrative agency from the Department of the
Treasury that regulates merchandise importation. 19 U.S.C. § 1624 (1982).
7 See Atwood, Import Restrictions on Trademarked Merchandise-The Role of the United
States Bureau of Customs, 59 TRADEMARK REP. 301, 301-09 (1969). Because gray market
goods are purchased abroad at a discount they can be sold in the United States at a price
significantly lower than the U.S. trademarked goods. See Mackintosh, Grey Market Imports:
Burgeoning Crisis or Emerging Policy, 11 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 283, 285 (1986). One
theory for the price discrepancy relies on the fluctuating currency rates and the strength of
the U.S. dollar overseas. See Comment, supra note I, at 58. Another possibility for the
lower price of gray goods is the benefit that gray marketeers receive from the advertising,
promotion, and warranty servicing of the U.S. trademark owner. Id. The gray marketeers
need to advertise only their lower price. See also Note, The Greying of American Trademarks:
The Genuine Goods Exclusion Act and The Incongruity of Customs Regulation 19 C.F.R. § 133.21,
54 FORDHAM L. REV. 83, 86 n.9 (1985) (citing Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp.
1163, 1167 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)). Because of this lucrative gray market, U.S. trademark own-
ers are losing market share and profits. Id. at 84. Gray market opponents maintain that
continued importation of these goods will destroy the trademark's property value by al-
lowing third parties to obtain a free ride on the products' goodwill. See Kelly, An Overview
of the Influx of Gray Market Goods Into the United States, 11 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 231,
231-32 (1986).
8 The Custom Service regulation states:
§ 133.21 Restrictions on importation of articles bearing recorded trademarks
and trade names.
(a)Copying or simulating marks or names. Articles of foreign or domestic manu-
facture bearing a mark or name copying or simulating a recorded trademark
or tradename shall be denied entry and are subject to forfeiture as prohibited
importations. A "copying or simulating" mark or name is an actual counter-
feit of the recorded mark or name or is one which so resembles it as to be
likely to cause the public to associate the copying or simulating mark with the
recorded mark or name.
(b) Identical trademark. Foreign-made articles bearing a trademark identical
with one owned and recorded by a citizen of the United States or a corpora-
tion or association created or organized with in the United States are subject
to seizure and forfeiture as prohibited importations.
19 C.F.R. § 133.21(a)-(b) (1988).
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ports of unauthorized trademarked goods if either the foreign sup-
plier and the U.S. trademark owner are affiliated companies or part
of the same company, or if the imported articles are manufactured
with the authorization of the U.S. trademark owner. 9 The former
situation is known as the common-control exception, while the latter
is referred to as the authorized-use exception. 10 Over the years
judges and commentators have disagreed over the validity of the reg-
ulations. I The U.S. Supreme Court in K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. 12
resolved the controversy and held that the common-control excep-
tion' 3 was a consistent interpretation of section 526.14 The Court
further held that the authorized-use exception 15 was invalid and con-
cluded that goods made in a foreign country by an independent for-
eign manufacturer could not be removed from the scope of section
526.16 This Note examines the rationale behind the Court's decision
in K Mart Corp., the development of trademark law as it pertains to
gray market goods, and the possible ramifications of the decision on
U.S. industry.
In K Mart Corp. the Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of Ameri-
can Trademarks (COPIAT) brought suit against the United States,
the Commissioner of Customs, and the Secretary of the Treasury,
seeking a declaration to invalidate the common-control and author-
ized-use exceptions as inconsistent with section 526 of the Tariff Act
and an injunction against its enforcement. 17 COPIAT is a trade as-
sociation of U.S. companies that own registered U.S. trademarks.
Two of its members, Cartier, Inc. and Charles of the Ritz Group
Ltd., joined in the suit. K Mart Corp. and 47th Street Photo inter-
9 The relevant portion of section 133.21 (c) provides:
(c) Restrictions not applicable. The restrictions set forth in paragraphs (a) and
(b) of this section do not apply to imported articles, when:
(1) Both the foreign and the U.S. trademark or trade name are owned
by the same person or business entity;
(2) The foreign and domestic trademark or trade name owners are par-
ent and subsidiary companies or are otherwise subject to common ownership
or control (see §§ 133.2(d) and 133.12(d));
(3) The articles of foreign manufacture bear a recorded trademark or
trade name applied under authorization of the U.S. owner.
19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(1)-(3) (1988).
10 Id.
II See Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of Am. Trademarks v. United States
(COPIAT), 790 F.2d 903, 904-05 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (rejectiig the regulation as inconsistent
with section 526); Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315, 316 (2d Cir. 1986) (up-
holding the regulation); Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(upholding the regulation as consistent with section 526).
12 108 S. Ct. 1811 (1988).
13 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(1)-(2) (1988).
14 K Mart Corp., 108 S. Ct. at 1817-18.
15 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(3) (1988).
16 K Mart Corp., 108 S. Ct. at 1818-19.
17 Id. at 1816-17.
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vened as defendants.' 8 The district court upheld the regulation as a
sufficiently reasonable interpretation of the statute.' 9 The D.C. Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court 20 and concluded
that. the regulation was an unreasonable administrative interpreta-
tion of section 526.21 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to
consider whether the Customs Service regulation is consistent with
section 526.
In analyzing the validity of the Customs regulation, the Court
considered three distinct commercial relationships between U.S.
trademark holders and foreign manufacturers. 22 First, the Court dis-
cussed the typical gray market situation. 23 There, a domestic firm
purchases from an independent foreign company the right to use its
trademark in the sale of its goods.2 4 When a foreign firm sells some
of its goods bearing the trademark abroad to a third party who sub-
sequently imports them into the U.S. for resale, these imported
goods become gray-market goods that compete with the U.S. trade-
marked goods. 25
Second, the Court discussed the gray market situation that in-
volves a domestic firm with a registered U.S. trademark for goods
manufactured abroad by an affiliated manufacturer. 26 The gray mar-
ket develops when a third party purchases the goods abroad and im-
ports them into the United States.2 7 There are three variations to
this gray market situation. 28 The first variation occurs when the for-
eign manufacturer attempts to control distribution in the United
States by establishing a subsidiary. 29 Other gray market instances
18 Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of Am. Trademarks v. United States, 790 F.2d
903, 904 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
19 Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of Am. Trademarks v. United States, 598 F.
Supp. 844, 851 (D.D.C. 1984).
20 See id. In its analysis, the court looked to the legislative history, judicial decisions,
legislative acquiescence, and the long-standing policy of the Customs Service. Id. at 852.
21 COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 916-17.
22 K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., - U.S -, 108 S. Ct. 1811, 1814-15 (1988). The
possible combinations encountered on the gray market are many and varied.
For example, the U.S. and foreign trademark rights may be owned by the
same entity or by related companies, or by wholly separate companies. The
goods of the U.S. owner may be imported and may be identical to, or differ-
ent from, the parallel import. Goods may be produced in the U.S. by the
U.S. trademark owner and different goods produced abroad by the U.S.
owner or its affiliate. Services and warranties may or may not be the same as
abroad. A foreign licensee (i.e., related company) may be required by for-
eign law and may not be subject to meaningful control by the U.S. owner.
Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1570 n.24 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
23 K Mart Corp., 108 S. Ct. at 1814-15.
24 Id. The U.S. Supreme Court referred to this relationship as a "case 1" gray
market.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 1815. The Court referred to this relationship as a "case 2" gray market.
27 Id.
28 Id. These variations are often labeled "case 2a," "case 2b," and "case 2c."
29 Id.
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arise when an U.S. company establishes a manufacturing subsidiary
abroad or owns an unincorporated manufacturing division
overseas.
30
In the third context, a domestic trademark holder authorizes an
independent foreign firm to use its trademark, usually selling the
company the exclusive rights for distribution in a particular foreign
area.3' When a foreign firm or a third party imports the goods into
the United States, a gray market results. 32
In its analysis, the Court first determined whether the regulation
was consistent with the language of section 526. 33 The Court noted
precedent which stated that if a regulation was not in conflict with
the plain language of the statute, "a reviewing court must give defer-
ence to the agency's interpretation of the statute."13 4 All nine Jus-
tices agreed that section 526 bars importation of gray market goods
when a U.S. firm purchases the rights to the trademark from an in-
dependent foreign manufacturer. 35 In addition, the Court con-
cluded that the Customs Service regulation providing for a common-
control exception 36 is a permissible construction of the statute.3 7
30 Id.
31 Id. This situation is referred to as "case 3."
32 Id.
33 Id. at 1817.
34 Id. at 1817 (citing United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 246 n.4 (1985)). The U.S.
Supreme Court elaborated on the rules of statutory construction in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The Chevron Court formulated a two part analysis for re-
viewing an agency's construction of a statute it administers. Id. at 842. First, the court
must determine if Congress has directly addressed the question at issue. If the congres-
sional intent is clear, then the court and the agency must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress. Id. at 843. According to the Court: "The judiciary is the
final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject administrative construc-
tions which are contrary to clear congressional intent." Id. at 843 n.9. See also FEC v.
Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 32 (1981); SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S.
103, 117-18 (1978); FMC v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1973). If, on the
other hand, the Court decided that Congress has not directly addressed the question or is
ambiguous as to the meaning then there is an implicit legislative delegation to the agency
regarding the particular question. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. For an agency to administer
effectively a congressionally created program it must be able to formulate policy and regu-
lations to fill any gap left by Congress. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974).
When the court determines that the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to an
issue addressed by the regulation, the court employs the second part of the statutory con-
struction analysis. The standard of review in this step is exceedingly deferential. Note, A
Framework forJudicial Review of an Agency Statutory Interpretation: Chevron U.S.A. v. Vatural Re-
sources Defense Council, 1985 DUKE L.J. 469, 478. The court must uphold the agency inter-
pretation if it is "based on a permissible construction of the statute." Chevron, 467 U.S. at
845.
35 K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., - U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 1811, 1818 (1988). This is the
case I situation and was first settled in A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel. See note 74 infra & accom-
panying text.
36 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(1)-(2) (1988).
37 K Mart Corp., 108 S. Ct. at 1817-18. Justice Kennedy, Justice White, Justice Bren-
nan, Justice Marshall, and Justice Stevens agreed to uphold the common-control excep-
tion. Justice Kennedy, with the concurrence of Justice White, concluded that the
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The Court stated that the meaning of "owned by" 38 was unclear and,
therefore it was permissible for the Customs Service to construe
"owned by" to apply to instances involving a foreign parent. 39 Con-
fusion over ownership existed because of the difficulty in distinguish-
ing which entity actually owned the trademark-the U.S. firm as a
subsidiary or the foreign parent.40 The Court further ruled that the
phrase "merchandise of foreign manufacture" was sufficiently am-
biguous to uphold the agency's interpretation of the regulation as it
applied in some gray market situations.4 According to Justice Ken-
nedy, the agency may reasonably interpret the phrase "of foreign
manufacture" as not applying to goods manufactured by foreign
subsidiary or division of a domestic company because of the ambigu-
ous wording of the statute.42 As a result, the Court upheld the com-
mon-control exception."3
In a separate opinion, Justice Brennan elaborated on the policy
regulation is a "permissible construction designed'to resolve statutory ambiguities." Id. at
1818.
38 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1982). For the full text of section 1526, see supra note 2.
39 K Mart Corp., 108 S. Ct. at 1818. This is the "case 2a" situation.
40 Id. The Court noted that: "Because of this ambiguity '[tihe Patent and Trademark
Office takes the position that ownership of marks among parent-subsidiary corporations
... is largely a matter to be decided between the parties themselves.' " Id. at 1821 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring) (quoting I J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 748
(2d ed. 1984)). This ambiguity does not exist in instances involving relationships similar
to cases 2b and 2c. In cases 2b and 2c the U.S. trademark holder is the parent corporation
and the true owner of the trademark, while the foreign firm is the subsidiary or division.
Id. at 1826 (Brennan, J., concurring).
41 Id. According the the Court, "merchandise of foreign manufacture" can be inter-
preted as goods manufactured in a foreign country, goods manufactured by a foreign com-
pany, or goods manufactured in a foreign country by a foreign company. Id. The
situations in which this phrase applies are referred to as case 2b and case 2c gray markets.
42 Id. at 1818. Justice Kennedy elaborated on the possible confusion facing the Cus-
toms Service because of the different interpretations that result from ambiguous words in
statutes. He stated:
I believe that agency regulations may give a varying interpretation of the
same phrase when that phrase appears in different statutes and different stat-
utory contexts. There may well be variances in purpose or circumstance that
have led the agency to adopt and apply dissimilar interpretations of the
phrase "of foreign manufacture" in other regulations implementing different
statutes.
Id. at 1818 n.4. Justice Kennedy pointed out that the Supreme Court permits an agency to
choose any reasonable definition of ambiguous phrases. Id. at 1817. The Court in United
States v. Shimer stated "[i]f this choice represents a reasonable accommodation of conflict-
ing policies that were committed to the agency's care by the statute, we should not disturb
it unless it appears from the statute or its legislative history that the accommodation is not
one that Congress would have sanctioned." 367 U.S. 374, 383 (1961). For a discussion on
an agency's role in statutory construction, see supra note 34. As a result, the Customs
Service is allowed to interpret the statute to read that goods manufactured by a foreign
subsidiary or division of a domestic company are not goods, "of foreign manufacture." K
Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., - U.S.-, 108 S. Ct. 1811, 1818 (1988).
43 K Mart Corp., 108 S. Ct. at 1817. Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, stated that
the decisive question in determining the correct interpretation of a statute is whether the
"language of the statute is clear or arguably ambiguous." Id. at 1818 n.4. He maintained
that "[t]he purported gloss any party gives to the statute, or any reference to legislative
history, is in the first instance irrelevant." Id.
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reasons behind the common-control exception.44 According to
Brennan, section 526 protects U.S. trademark owners from compet-
ing foreign merchandise bearing trademarks identical to U.S. trade-
marks. 45  Brennan stated that Congress would never extend the
protections provided by section 526 to affiliates of foreign manufac-
turers because of protectionist sentiments. 46 Therefore, the major-
ity's acceptance of the common-control exception was consistent
with the prevailing protectionist attitudes. 47
Justice Brennan also recognized the equitable motivation for ex-
cluding foreign affiliates from the protection of section 526.48 In a
typical gray market situation, the U.S. markholder has no control
over the independent foreign manufacturer's sales abroad to third
parties who might ultimately import the goods into the United
States. 49 Domestic firms with a registered U.S. trademark for goods
manufactured abroad may have more authority over the actions of its
subsidiary or division. The firm may also have some influence over
the parent. 50  On the other hand, the U.S. trademark owner who
purchased the trademark at arm's length from an independent for-
44 Id. at 1819. Justice Marshall and Justice Stevens concurred with Justice Brennan
and affirmed the common-control exception. In their decision they relied on the funda-
mental purpose of section 526 to protect only domestic interests. Id.
45 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1987).
46 K Mart Corp., 108 S. Ct. at 1820. Justice Brennan maintained that if a foreign man-
ufacturer could, merely by establishing a subsidiary in the United States, "insulate itself so
easily from the competition of parallel imports, much of section 526's limiting language
would be pointless." Id. at 1821.
The Tariff Act of 1930, which imposed the highest tariff duties in United States his-
tory, was representative of the protectionist viewpoint in the early 1930s. See Kersner &
Stein, supra note ,' at 260 n.48. In 1929 the Senate attempted to amend section 526 to
delete the final clause allowing U.S. trademark holders to consent to importation of for-
eign goods bearing their trademark. See S. REP. No. 37, 71st Cong., 1st Sess. 75 (1929).
The Senate Committee on Finance maintained that "where the laws of the United states
protect the interest of a trademark holder by allowing him a monopoly in the use of the
mark, it is reasonable to require as far as practicable, that in return, the holder of the mark
shall manufacture his goods in the United States." Id. Nevertheless, Congress reenacted
section 526 without any change in the Tariff Act of 1930. See 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1982).
The same protectionist sentiments that prevailed in the late 1920s and resulted in the
Tariff Act of 1930 are still prevalent largely due to the 'growing trade deficit. See Mackin-
tosh, supra note 7, at 210. Protectionists desire a policy against gray market imports that
would isolate the U.S. market from some foreign competition and preserve the domestic
industry. Id.
47 K Mart Corp., 108 S. Ct. at 1821. Justice Brennan further stated:
The barriers that Congress erected seem calculated to serve no purpose
other than to reserve exclusively to domestic, not foreign, interests the ex-
traordinary protection that setion 526 provides. But they are fragile barri-
ers indeed if a foreign manufacturer might by pass them by the simple device
of incorporating a shell domestic subsidiary and transferring to it a single
asset-the U.S. trademark.
Id. at 1820-21.
48 Id. at 1822-23.
49 See id. at 1823.
50 Id. The U.S. company and its foreign branch have many options available. They
may chose not to import directly to any other domestic firm or if possible prescribe resale
restrictions as a condition to sales. See id.
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eign firm stands to lose an appreciable amount because of gray mar-
ket competition. 5 i
A different majority of the Court found the authorized-use ex-
ception 52 invalid. 53 The Court reasoned that this exception was in-
consistent with the plain language of the statute.54 In this situation a
U.S. trademark owner who authorized an independent foreign man-
ufacturer to use his trademark abroad would be unable to utilize sec-
tion 526 to prohibit the importation of goods produced by this
foreign firm. 5 5 The Court found that this situation contradicted the
plain meaning of the statute.56 The ambiguous phrases in section
526, "owned by" and "of foreign manufacture," do not apply to the
authorized-use exception. 57
Justice Scalia, in a separate opinion, discussed the policy reasons
for rejecting the authorized-use exception and extending protection
to U.S. trademark owners who have authorized a foreign firm to use
its U.S. trademark abroad. 58 According to Justice Scalia, the equita-
ble motivations existing in this gray market are similar to those in the
typical gray market situation.59 Both gray market victims have the
same investment at stake, and the assignor's risk may be even
greater.60 The assignor risks the decline of the entire goodwill asso-
ciated with his trademark in this country. 61  Consequently, U.S.
companies who authorize the use of their trademarks abroad should
be granted the same protection that is available to the U.S. trade-
mark owner in the typical gray market situation. 62
51 Id. Not only do U.S. trademark owners invest a large sum of money to purchase
the trademark rights, but they expend more in securing the domestic goodwill of the prod-
uct. See Comment, supra note 1, at 60. Typical expenses include sales promotion and
brand advertising, inventory maintenance, customer relations, dealer training, and war-
ranty service. The domestic company in the case 2 situation does not have the same type
of investment at stake. K art Corp., 108 S. Ct. at 1823. The U.S. firm, in a relationship
such as case 1, deserves the protection of his property interest. Id. See also Comment, supra
note I, at 98. An affiliated member of a foreign company, however, should not have access
to section 526 for the purpose of securing a monopoly for its product in the United States.
52 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(3).
53 K Mart Corp., 108 S. Ct. at 1819. ChiefJustice Rehnquist, Justice Blackmun, Justice
O'Conner, and Justice Scalia concurred with Kennedy in this result. Id. at 1814.
54 Id. The Court concluded that invalidating and severing the authorized-use excep-
tion from the regulation would not disturb the force of the statute. Id.
55 19 C.F.R. § 133.2 1(c)(3).
56 K Mart Corp., 108 S. Ct. at 1819. According to the Court, under no reasonable
construction of the statutory language can goods made in a foreign country by an in-
dependent foreign manufacturer be removed from the purview of the statute. Id. at 1818-
19.
57 Id. at 1818.
58 K Mart Corp., 108 S. Ct. at 1836 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. According to Justice Scalia: "The U.S. assignee's innocent vulnerability to
gray-market imports is no greater than that of the U.S. trademark owner who assigns the
right to use his trademark abroad ..... Id.
62 Id.
[VOL. 14
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Justice Brennan disagreed with Scalia and stated that the equita-
ble motivations for excluding the foreign affiliates from section 526's
protection apply equally to the situation when a U.S. firm authorizes
a third party to use its trademark abroad. 63 According to Brennan,
the U.S. trademark owner has the ability to avoid this type of compe-
tition by refusing to license its trademark use overseas or by revoking
an already issued license. 64 Brennan stated that the authorized-use
exception should be upheld as reasonable. 65
Prior to the Court's decision in K Mart Corp., courts disagreed
over the scope of protection afforded by section 526 and the role of
the Customs Service's regulation in the enforcement of the statute.66
Congress enacted section 526 of the Tariff Act in response to a Sec-
ond Circuit Court of Appeals decision, A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 67 in
which the court refused to enjoin a parallel importation in the typical
gray market situation.68 The language of the regulation has also
changed numerous times. 69
63 Id. at 1830.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of Am. Trademarks v. United States, 790 F.2d
903 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (rejecting the regulation as inconsistent with section 526); Vivitar
Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (concluding that the regulation was
consistent with section 526); Sturges v. Clark D. Pease, 48 F.2d 1035 (2d Cir. 1931) (up-
holding section 526 in its broad form); Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (rejecting the related-party exception in the regulation as contrary to the
plain meaning of section 526); Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co., 548 F.
Supp. 1063 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (rejecting the related-party exception in the regulation as
contrary to section 526).
67 275 F. 539 (2d Cir. 1921), rev'd, 260 U.S. 689 (1923).
68 See Note, supra note 7, at 91.
69 For a discussion of the changes in section 526 since 1922, see Vivitar Corp. v.
United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1565-66 (Fed. Cir. 1985). In 1923 the agency first estab-
lished a regulation that barred the entry of foreign goods with a U.S. registered trademark
without the consent of the trademark owner. Id. at 1566. The original language of the
regulation merely recognized the fact that the U.S. trademark owners were entitled to the
protection of section 526. Id. The language, however, neither limited the scope of protec-
tion afforded by section 526, or provided any indication of the agency's interpretation of
the statute. See Note, supra note 7, at 99. See also Comment, supra note 1, at 71. No excep-
tions to this protection were provided. Vivitar Corp., 761 F.2d at 1565-66.
In 1936 the Customs Service first acted to restrict section 526's broad protection. Id.
at 1566. The Customs Service took a new approach and combined regulations controlling
section 526 and The Trademark Act into one regulation. This regulation prohibited
goods that copied or simulated the registered trademark. See Comment, supra note 1, at
72. Under the 1936 amendments, when the foreign trademark owner and the U.S. trade-
mark owner were the same person, partnership, association, or corporation, the importa-
tion of such goods was not prohibited. Vivitar Corp., 761 F.2d at 1566.
In 1953 the agency added the "related company" exception that denied protection to
affiliated companies from parallel imports. Vivitar Corp., 761 F.2d at 1566. According to
section 45 of the Lanham Act, "related company" is defined as "any person who legiti-
mately controls or is controlled by the registrant or applicant for registration in.respect to
the nature and quality of the goods or services in connection with which the mark is used."
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1982). In addition, the 1953 regulations required U.S. companies to
disclose to the agency all related companies. Later in 1959 Customs returned to the more
limited 1936 statute that included the "same entity" exception. Vivitar Corp., 761 F.2d at
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In the early 1900s courts and commentators believed that trade-
marks provided the holder with neither a property interest nor mo-
nopoly power over intrabrand competition. 70 Rather, their utility
was to inform consumers of the origin of the product.71 Use of the
trademark by competitors was acceptable so long as the merchandise
was identical to the goods of the domestic company.72 The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld this "universality theory" in
Katzel.7 3
In Katzel a French manufacturer of face powder sold its U.S.
trademark and U.S. business to a U.S. citizen, A Bourjois & Co. The
U.S. company continued to purcha se the face powder in bulk from
the French manufacturer, and the French manufacturer continued to
sell the powder with the same trademark in France. The defendant
purchased the face powder in France and imported it into the United
States for resale. The U.S. trademark owner, Bourjois, filed suit
under the Trademark Act. The Second Circuit, relying on the belief
that genuine goods cannot infringe a U.S. trademark, reversed the
district court and allowed the importation. 74 This result, however,
seemed unfair to the domestic markholder who purchased a foreign
manufacturer's trademark rights for exclusive sales in the United
States and who would be forced to compete -with the cheaper gray
market goods under this theory. Congress reacted by enacting the
predecessor of section 526. The U.S. Supreme Court later reversed
the Second Circuit and held that the true significance of a trademark
was not indication of origin, but evidence of the local business good-
will of the U.S. markholder.75
1567. With the return to a less restrictive regulation, a domestic affiliate of a foreign firm
who qualifies as the "same company" could restructure the corporate organization to a
"related company" that was not excluded. See Comment, supra note 1, at 75. Because of
this opportunity for abuse, Customs began interpreting "same entity" to include a par-
ent/subsidiary relationship and permitted entry of these goods. Vivitar Corp., 761 F.2d at
1567. In addition, the revised regulations did not require disclosure except in a princi-
ple/agent relationship. Id.
In 1972 the agency promulgated the "common-control" and "authorized-use" excep-
tions presently employed. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(l)-(3) (1987). For the text of section
133.21(c), see supra note 9. From 1923 to 1936 and from 1959 to 1972 the Customs Ser-
vice permitted entry of genuine goods even if the foreign firm and the U.S. company were
related. See Note, supra note 7, at 101.
70 Katzel, 275 F. at 543. See also Atwood, supra note 7, at 303; Note, The Gray Market
Controversy: Is a Resolution Necessary?, 13 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 279, 285 n.33 (1987).
71 Katzel, 275 F. at 543.
72 Id. Under the universality theory of trademark law, the function of the trademark
is to indicate the source of origin or producer. See Atwood, supra note 7, at 303. Once a
trademark is legally applied to merchandise, these goods can be sold anywhere and will
not be an infringement even if the goods enter another country where another person
owns the exclusive right to that trademark. Comment, supra note 7, at 107. Under the
universality principle, the U.S. trademark assignee's only rights against its foreign assignor
are for breach of contract or unfair competition. Id.
73 275 F. at 540.
74 Id. at 543.
75 A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1923). This case was a trademark in-
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Because the Court reversed Katzel, the validity of the universality
principle of trademark law is questionable. Courts have employed
the "territoriality theory" instead. 76 This theory provides that be-
cause a trademark was a formation of each country's laws, no na-
tion's trademark laws could be applied outside the country to create
"universal" trademarks. 77 The territoriality viewpoint is the current
state of trademark law.7 8
In 1931 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Sturges v. Clark
D. Pease 79 upheld section 526 in its broad form and refused to allow
the importation of a good for personal use if it contained a U.S.
trademark purchased and owned by a U.S. company.80 The Sturges
court concluded that the U.S. trademark owner is entitled to the ben-
efit of all the sales in the United States of goods bearing that trade-
mark.8 1 As a result, the Sturges court rejected the argument that
section 526's protection should be applied only to the typical gray
market situation. 82
Because of the expansion of the gray market in the 1980s, litiga-
tion over the scope of section 526 increased dramatically. 83 Trade-
mark holders challenged the validity of the Customs Service
regulations. 84 Many U.S. trademark holders doubted the agency's
authority to construe the statute so narrowly because the agency first
enforced the restrictions long after the original enactment of section
52685 and because of the broad wording of the statute.86 The courts'
decisions varied greatly with the rulings based on legislative history
of section 526, administrative interpretation, and previous judicial
decisions. 87
fringement case and not a suit against importation. Consequently, the Court did not men-
tion the predecessor of section 526.
76 Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1171 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (stating
that the territoriality theory has replaced the universality theory).
77 Katzel, 260 U.S. at 692. See also Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of Am. Trade-
marks v. United States, 598 F. Supp. 844, 848 (D.D.C. 1984).
78 See Note, supra note 7, at 107.
79 48 F.2d 1035 (2d Cir. 1931). In this case the plaintiff purchased an Hispano-Suiza
car in France and was prevented from importing it into the U.S. because it contained the
same trademark that was registered in the United States by the defendant. Id.
80 Id. at 1037.
81 Id. The court reasoned that if section 526 did not apply to personal use, goods
that were really intended for resale might enter under the guise of personal use. Id.
82 Id. Because the Sturges court rejected a relatively minor exception for personal use,
the court would probably not have permitted the larger exceptions included in the present
Customs Service regulation. See Kersner & Stein, supra note 1, at 267.
83 Kersner & Stein, supra note i, at 271.
84 See supra note 13. Trademark owners first directed their efforts to the legislature.
After fruitless lobbying efforts, the trademark owners turned to the courts for relief. K
Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., - U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 1811, 1819 (1988).
85 Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of Am. Trademarks v. United States, 790 F.2d
903, 917 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
86 K Mart Corp., 108 S. Ct. at 1819-20.
87 See supra note 11.
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The first group of litigation during the 1980s consisted of suits
brought against identified importers of gray market goods. For ex-
ample, in Bell & Howell.: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co. 88 a U.S. corpo-
ration, owned by two subsidiaries of a Japanese corporation, and the
holder of the U.S. trademark brought suit to enjoin an importer from
distributing products bearing its trademarks. 89 The court rejected
the common-control exception and stated that section 526 conferred
the right to bar importations to all U.S. citizens. 90 The district court
also rejected the common-control exception in Osawa & Co. v. B & H
Photo as contrary to the plain meaning of section 526.91 The court
reasoned that section 526 contained no indication that its scope de-
pended on subtle variations in the relationship between the U.S.
markholder and the foreign markholder.92
Prior to the Court's decision in K Mart Corp., three lower courts
addressed the validity of the regulations. 93 All three cases involved
goods bearing a trademark owned by a U.S. company that were im-
ported into the United States.94 The imported goods had been man-
ufactured by foreign affiliates of the U.S. trademark owner. 95 The
Customs Service concluded that the goods were exempt from section
526 under the common-control exception. The trademark owners
brought suit against the Secretary of the Treasury, the United States,
and the Customs Service and sought both a declaration that the reg-
ulations were invalid and injunctive relief to prohibit their
enforcement. 96
In Vivitar Corp. v. United States97 the Federal Circuit concluded
that the trademark holders were relying erroneously on the assump-
tion that the Customs' regulations were legislative rules having the
88 548 F. Supp. 1063 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). The plaintiff sold photographic equipment
that was manufactured in Japan. Id.
89 Id. at 1063.
90 Id. at 1078-79. According to the court: "The language does not reasonable admit
of a special limitation based upon foreign ownership of an American company. An Ameri-
can subsidiary of a foreign company is no less American for being a foreign company's
subsidiary .... " Id. at 1075-76. On appeal, the Second Circuit vacated the district court's
preliminary injunction on the ground that the plaintiff failed to show irreparable harm.
Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co., 719 F.2d 42, 46 (2d Cir. 1983).
91 Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1177 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
92 Id. at 1177. The Osawa court also would not limit the application of section 526 to
the narrow fact situation in Katzel. According to the court, the "defendants have suggested
no compelling reason to doubt that the statute means what it says." Id. at 1175.
93 See Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of Am. Trademarks v. United States, 790
F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986);
Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Vivitar Corp., 761 F.2d at 1552. In Vivitar Cop. the trademark holder was a Califor-
nia corporation and the owner of the VIVITAR trademark. Id. at 1556. Vivitar Corpora-
tion distributes in the United States and overseas photographic equipment that is
produced in Japan. Id.
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force of law.98 According to the court, Congress had not delegated
such authority to the Customs Service under section 526.99 Rather,
the regulations merely defined Customs' role in the administrative
enforcement of the statute and had no effect on the scope of protec-
tion provided by section 526.100 In addition, the court reasoned that
U.S. trademark owners who felt that Customs had mistakenly permit-
ted imports bearing their trademark could take their complaint to the
courts.' 10 In this light, the court concluded that the regulation was
consistent with the statute.' 0 2
In Olympus Corp. v. United States the Second Circuit concurred
with Vivitar Corp. and concluded that the regulations limit only the
court's obligation to enforce the statute by excluding goods; the reg-
ulations do not limit the scope of the protection. 0 3 The court did
find the regulation to be of "questionable wisdom," but upheld it
because of congressional acquiescence to the long-standing adminis-
trative practice.10 4  Accordingly, the court maintained that any
changes should result from the legislature. 10 5 The Olympus Corp.
court upheld the regulation and concurred with Vivitar Corp. on the
availability of a private action to aggrieved markholders.' 0 6
98 Id. at 1569.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 1570.
102 Id. at 1570-7 1. While the Vivitar Corp. court upheld the regulations, the court did
not conclude that the regulations controlled the scope of section 526. Id.
103 Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315, 320 (2d Cir. 1986). In this case,
the plaintiff was a wholly owned subsidiary of the Olympus Optical Co., Ltd., a Japanese
Corporation that produces photographic equipment. Id. at 317. The plaintiff is the regis-
tered owner of the OLYMPUS trademark in the United States. Id.
104 Id. at 320. In his dissent, Judge Winter objected to the majority's deference to
Congress' purported long-standing acquiescence. Rather, Winter focused on the lack of
continuity in the practice of the Customs Service. Id. at 322 (Winter, J., dissenting).
105 Id. at 320-21. The COPIA T court took the opposite position. In COPIA T the court
believed that merely because Congress has failed to enact legislation to the contrary does
not mean that they accept the practice of Customs. According to the court: "Congress
cannot be obliged affirmatively to correct subsequent administrative interpretations incon-
sistent with original legislative intent; that is the responsibility of the courts." Coalition to
Preserve the Integrity of Am. Trademarks v. United States, 790 F.2d 903, 917 (D.C. Cir.
1986). See also Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
106 Olympus Corp., 792 F.2d at 320. Customs may limit its role in the gray market con-
troversy because there also exists a private right of action under the Genuine Goods Ex-
clusion Act, section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930. Section 526(c) reads:
Any person dealing in any such merchandise may be enjoined from dealing
therein within the United States or may be required to export or destroy such
merchandise or to remove or obliterate such trademark and shall be liable
for the same damages and profits provided for wrongful use of a trademark
under the provisions of section 81 to 109 of title 15.
19 U.S.C. § 1526(c) (1987). ,A U.S. trademark owner who has registered its trademark
with the Patent and Trademark office and Customs may sue anyone importing trade-
marked merchandise without prior written consent. Olympus Corp., 792 F.2d at 320. The
majority view was that this private remedy is not limited by the common-control exception
in Customs' regulations. Once the trademark has been recorded with the proper authori-
ties, the U.S. trademark owner may sue in federal court to prevent the unauthorized im-
N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
In The Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks v.
United States 107 the District of Columbia Circuit, however, rejected
the regulation as inconsistent with section 526.108 According to the
court, the statute, by its plain meaning, does not allow exceptions
based upon either a relationship that might exist between the domes-
tic and the foreign trademark holder or on the authorization of the
U.S. holder for use of the mark abroad.' 0 9 In considering giving def-
erence to the agency's practice, 110 the court concluded that "the
Customs Service's interpretation of Section 526 does not display the
necessary thoroughness, validity, and consistency to merit judicial
acceptance."I11 In addition, the COPIAT court, although agreeing
with the Vivitar Corp. court's finding of inconsistency, 21 2 rejected the
Vivitar Corp. court's holding that the regulation can be upheld as a
reasonable exercise of administratively initiated enforcement.' 3
The court reasoned that because the Customs Service has never of-
fered this justification before, it cannot rely upon it now. 1 4 The
court granted the appellants declaratory relief, but denied their re-
quest for an injunction." 15
In K Mart Corp. the Supreme Court resolved the split in the Cir-
cuits and narrowed the circumstances in which gray market goods
may enter the United States under regulatory approval by invalidat-
ing the authorized-use exception and defining the scope of the com-
mon-control exception.' 16 While the Court stated that its decision
was based on the rules of statutory construction, the Court's decision
clearly reflects its recognition of policy considerations. For example,
the Court noted the increased volume of gray market imports and
the need for a cohesive policy."1 7 The Court also pointed out that
when a U.S. trademark holder sells goods domestically at a higher
portation of genuinely trademarked items. This private action may at times prove to be an
inadequate remedy. Identifying the gray market importers may be difficult and it may lead
to an endless series of lawsuits. Restani, An Introduction to the Gray Market Controversy, 13
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 235, 242 (1987).
107 790 F.2d at 903. See supra note 18.
108 790 F.2d at 913.
109 Id. This court believed that "what the statute meant in 1922 and in 1930 is what it
means today." Id.
110 Id. The court determined that deference to an agency's construction is inappropri-
ate when the intent of Congress is evident. Id. at 914.
1 1 Id. at 916.
112 Id. at 917. Both the Vivitar Corp. and COPIAT courts believed that the Customs
Service regulations do not represent a reasonable interpretation of section 526. See Vivitar
Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1565-68 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
113 See Vivitar Corp., 761 F.2d at 1571.
114 Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of Am. Trademarks v. United States, 790 F.2d
903, 918 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
115 Id. The court believed that injunctive relief would be inappropriate at this time,
but remanded to the district court for the issuance of a declaratory judgment stating that
the common-control and authorized-use exceptions are invalid. Id. at 918.
116 K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., - U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 1811, 1812-13 (1988).
117 id. at 1828.
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price than for which they are sold abroad, the incentive arises for
importers to purchase these goods abroad and resell them in the
United States at a lower price than the U.S. firm.1 18 Gray market
goods also obtain a free ride on the promotion, advertising, and
goodwill of the U.S. company. In addition, most gray market goods
lack the services and warranties that accompany U.S. goods.' 19
In K Mart Corp. the Court looked to the rules of statutory con-
struction.1 20 The Court noted that when a statute is clear and unam-
biguous, courts do not defer to an agency's interpretation. 121 On
the other hand, an agency is allowed to interpret ambiguous lan-
guage in any reasonable manner so long as the agency's interpreta-
tion does not contradict the plain meaning of the statute. 122 Because
the exact meaning of "owned by" and "merchandise of foreign man-
ufacture" were unclear, the Court concluded that the Customs Ser-
vice's interpretations were reasonable and allowed them to stand.' 23
The Court applied the statutory interpretation rules to the author-
ized-use exception and concluded that the exception is contrary to
the plain meaning of the statute. 12 4 The Court left unanswered the
appropriate role, in evaluating administrative regulations, of legisla-
tive history, agency procedure, and congressional acquiescence. Jus-
tice Kennedy determined that these considerations were
unimportant to the Court's analysis. According to Kennedy, the only
pertinent questions were whether the statute was ambiguous and
whether the agency's regulations were reasonable interpretations.
Nevertheless, he noted that in other contexts the legislative history
and agency practice may be the only issues for consideration.' 25 As a
result, courts addressing different factual situations may not benefit
from K Mart Corp. in their assessments.
Because the majority reached its decision by applying the rules
for statutory construction, the validity of the universal and territorial
theories relied upon by lower courts remains uncertain. For exam-
ple, one dispute concerned whether Congress intended for this
amendment to the Tariff Act of 1922 to completely reject the univer-
sality theory or to merely correct an inequity in the existing trade-
mark law. Most of the lower courts believed that Congress actually
118 Id. This enables the importers to capture a share of the profits. See Olympus Corp.
v. United States, 792 F.2d 315, 320 (2d Cir. 1986).
119 See Note, supra note 7, at 85.
120 K Mart Corp., 108 S. Ct. at 1817.
121 Id. at 1817. The Court noted that "traditional deference given to an agency's in-
terpretation is not to be applied to alter the clear expressed intent of Congress." Id. (quot-
ing Board of Governors v. Dimension Financial Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 368 (1986)). For a
discussion on statutory construction, see supra note 34.
122 K Mart Corp., 108 S. Ct. at 1817.
123 Id. at 1818.
124 Id. at 1818-19.
125 Id. at 1818 n.4.
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intended a sweeping rejection of the prevailing view that a trademark
that is genuine in a foreign country would be genuine in the United
States. 126 According to this view, Congress intended a broad scope
for section 526.127 In K Mart Corp. Kennedy did not discuss the scope
of trademark law.' 28 In his opinion, Kennedy upheld the regulation
by relying on statutory interpretation, and did not address congres-
sional intent.12 9 Justice Brennan,' 30 however, in a separate opinion,
concluded that Congress' only purpose in enacting section 526 was
to overrule Katzel 131 by protecting the typical gray market situation
and not to completely overhaul the theory of trademark law.' 32 The
intent of Congress in enacting section 526 remains uncertain even
after the K Mart Corp. decision. Unless Congress acts to clarify its
position with further legislation, courts will determine the scope of
section 526 by using rules of statutory construction.
Another unresolved issue involves the role of the Customs Ser-
vice's actual practice regarding gray market imports. Circuit courts
believed that this role was significant in their determinations. The
Second Circuit in Olympus Corp. believed that Customs had consist-
ently interpreted the statute to allow them to permit entry of trade-
marked goods imported under the common-control exception.' 33
The Federal Circuit in Vivitar Corp., however, argued that Customs
has continuously changed its view of its role of interpreting section
526.13 4 The Vivitar Corp. court stated that the Customs Service ad-
justs its regulations to reflect current judicial decisions and should
not be relied on to make judgments. 13 5 In K Mart Corp. Justice Ken-
nedy did not rely on the role of the Customs Service. Nevertheless,
Justice Brennan, in a separate opinion, reasoned that Customs main-
tained a long-standing position of not protecting trademarked goods
126 Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of Am. Trademarks v. United States, 790 F.2d
903, 910 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
127 See id. at 912; Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1985);
Sturges v. Clark D. Pease, 48 F.2d 1035, 1037 (2d Cir. 1931); Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo,
589 F. Supp. 1163, 1175 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply
Co., 548 F. Supp. 1063, 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
128 K Mart Corp., 108 S. Ct. at 1817-19.
129 Id.
IS0 Justice Marshall andJustice White joined justice Brennan. Id. at 1819.
131 Id. at 1823. Justice Brennan wrote: "The sparse legislative history confirms that
Congress's sole goal was to overrule Katzel." Id. at 1824.
132 Id. at 1826. Justice Brennan stated that "since Congress did not so much as hint
that it was engaged in such an ambitious task, the more plausible reading of the cryptic
Conference Report is that Congress intended merely to remedy a specific inequity that the
prevailing doctrine produced, not to abolish the entire doctrine that produced it." Id.
133 Olympus Corp. v. United States; 792 F.2d 315, 319 (2d Cir. 1986).
134 The Customs Service, joined by the Department ofJustice, filed amicus curiae brief
for Masel Supply Co. in which they stated that section 526 should be construed in accord-
ance with the plain language of the statute. Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552,
1568 (Fed. Cir. 1985). This represents a drastic change of opinion. See Kersner & Stein,
supra note I, at 271.
135 Vivitar Corp., 761 F.2d at 1568.
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from affiliated firms. 136
The K Mart Corp. decision provides concrete guidance to U.S.
trademark owners, parallel importers, and the Customs Service. The
Court legitimized the administrative practice of permitting entry of
gray market goods if the foreign manufacturer and the U.S. company
are related. Nevertheless, this regulatory authority does not neces-
sarily prevent further disputes. In its analysis, the Court enumerated
the possible international corporate relationships and studied their
effects on the gray market and competition. By upholding the com-
mon-control exception, the Court reasoned that Congress did not
set out to provide the means, through section 526, for foreign or
multinational corporations to enforce exclusive U.S.
distributorships.
As a result of the Court's decision to exclude related entities
from the protection of section 526, the Customs Service may face
intricate corporate restructuring developed to circumvent the mean-
ing of common-control. Because the regulations define "common
ownership" as "individual or aggregate ownership of more than 50
percent of the business entity,"' 37 and define "common control" as
the "effective control in policy and operations,"' 138 multinational
corporations could manipulate their holdings to become a U.S. com-
pany that is not related or controlled by the foreign entity. 139 While
this is a possibility, it is unlikely that it would be successful given
Customs' experience in dealing with gray marketeers.
Because demand for discounted goods in the United States is so
high the gray market controversy is likely to continue. 140 In addi-
tion, there is a strong incentive on the part of trademark owners to
protect their trademark from all gray market exploitation.' 4 ' Trade-
mark owners will turn to new legal theories to achieve their desired
results. 142
136 K 1art Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., - U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 1811, 1819 (1988) (Brennan, J.,
concurring). Because Justice Brennan did not write for the majority, his opinion does not
have the value of precedent.
137 19 C.F.R. § 133.2(d)(1) (1988).
138 19 C.F.R. § 133.2(d)(2) (1988).
139 Sandier, Gray M.arket Goods: The Controversy will Continue, 13 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.
267, 273 (1987). This would be accomplished with sound business planning that may
result in a company with only 49% of it owned by the foreign entity. The actual foreign
participation in the policy-making and operations control may be disguised so as not to be
commonly controlled. Id.
140 Id. at 276. With the gray market estimated at $5 to $10 billion annually, and with
retailers such as K Mart Corporation, which purchased between $250 and $350 million of
gray goods per year, gray market importation will remain a part of U.S. economy. Hansen,
supra note 5, at 250 n.7, 257 n.29 (1987).
141 Sandier, supra note 139, at 277. These trademark owners have the resources and
incentive to find ways to stop the flow of gray market goods. Id. Trademark owners are
willing to engage in expensive litigation to protect their property interest and to increase
the costs of doing business in the gray market. Hansen, supra note 5, at 250 n.7.
142 Private actions under section 526 are unlikely to be successful if the Customs Ser-
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While the exact economic outcome of the Supreme Court's deci-
sion is uncertain, 143 the Court's rejection of the authorized-use ex-
ception may decrease gray market importation. 44 The fluctuations
in the value of the U.S. dollar, however, account for the greatest vari-
ation in the volume of the gray market. 145 Regardless of the impact
of the Court's decision on gray market importation, the Court ended
the confusion and inconsistency surrounding the enforcement of
section 526 in cases involving affiliated companies. No longer will
there be a different holding for each circuit. By utilizing the rules for
statutory construction, the Court made the correct decision regard-
ing a controversial issue. Furthermore, the Court ruled in a manner
that would withstand rehearing by the Court. K Mart Corp. is a fair
decision that upholds the protection of section 526 in cases when a
U.S. firm is the assignor or assignee of a trademark 46 (case 1 and
case 3). For U.S. firms that are closely connected with foreign manu-
facturers, other avenues of protection are available such as internal
distribution controls. 147 By legitimizing portions of the gray market,
the Court encouraged the policy of competition in U.S. markets by
enabling consumers to benefit from this competition.148 Because the
Court validated the common-control exception, the K Mart Corp. de-
cision also has the practical effect of preventing a foreign manufac-
turer, through its U.S. distributor, from establishing artificially high
vice determines that an imported gray good comes under the common-control exception.
As a result, trademark owners may protect their interests under copyright law. Instead of
securing trademarks for their products, the owners may secure copyrights. Sandier, supra
note 139, at 274. See also 17 U.S.C. § 602(a)-(b) (1982) (prohibiting copyright infringe-
ment). Trademark owners may also pursue alternative theories such as breach of contract
claims and civil fraud claims to protect their property interest. Sandier, supra note 139, at
274. See Johnson cJohnson v. Dal Int'l Trading, 798 F.2d 100 (3d Cir. 1986). In Johnson
&Johnson the seller claimed that it had been fraudulently induced to sell. Id. at 101.
143 Some commentators and economic analysts believe that the potential consumer
savings with gray goods is minimal. The gray good seller may attempt to sell the gray
goods at a price close to the authorized U.S. dealer's retail price in order to increase his
profit margin. In this instance, it is the gray marketeer who will benefit from the lower
priced gray goods and not consumers. See In re Certain Alkaline Batteries, 225 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 823, 835 (U.S.I.T.C. 1986) (finding that the price of gray market Duracell batteries
is the same as U.S. trademarked Duracell batteries). See also Note, supra note 7, at 85-87
nn. 8, 9, & 11.
Other commentators believe that consumers are the ultimate beneficiaries of the gray
market. By selling the gray goods for 30% to 40% below market price, these importers
usually retail goods for less than the wholesale price set by U.S. exclusive dealers and still
make a profit. Are Those Cheap Commerce Prices for Real, 50 CONSUMER REPS. 300 (1985).
144 Hansen, supra note 5, at 255 n.26.
145 Because gray marketeers usually operate on a small profit margin, a slight decline
in the dollar affects the profitability of the enterprise and reduces the incentive to import
gray goods.
146 K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., - U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 1811, 1818-20 (1988). This
involves a case 1 and case 3 gray market.
147 Id. at 1823.
148 19 C.F.R. § 133 (1987).
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